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I. Introduction 
lN WAYS GREAT AND SMALL, the language of the U.S. Constitution has 
importance to the everyday workings of American society. The defi-
nition of the rights of individuals and the structure of government de-
pends upon constitutional interpretation for meaning and direction. 
However, the words of this fundamental legal and social document do 
not convey an unchanging and precise blueprint for setting the limits 
of governmental authority and the edge of individual autonomy. 1 With 
1. Justice Sutherland addressed the issue of constitutional meaning in the landmark 
case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). He wrote that the social 
regulation of human conduct changes over time in tandem with the alterations in the 
"complex conditions of our day." !d. at 387. As conditions change, a regulation, which 
would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive fifty or one hundred years prior 
would be uniformly sustained as being wise, necessary and valid under existing con-
ditions. However, in his mind, the essential meaning of the Constitution never varied; 
rather its contextual application would shift with societal developments. Sutherland's 
distinction between "meaning" and "application" actually minimized the significance 
of judicial interpretation and asserted an essential consistency in the Constitution. !d. 
Such a view would not be surprising for a modem-day textual originalist but it seems 
incongruous for a justice who frequently joined in striking down legislation under the 
banner of substantive due process. 
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regard to the community's control of land use, these matters of consti-
tutional imprecision and redefinition are particularly perplexing for 
government, landowners, and residents alike. Often, the simplicity of 
the U.S. Constitution's language belies the infinite complexity of its 
subject. Relatively simple words such as these conceal complicated 
ideas, which must be applied in a myriad of differing situations. 
When is property "taken" and when is an owner denied property 
without "due process"? The answers to these questions are at the same 
time profound and mundane touching upon matters of complex, con-
stitutional theory and applying to the everyday operation of local land-
use regulation. The answers to these questions have major significance 
both to state and local governments as they attempt to deal with con-
tinuing demands of community development and to private landowners 
and developers. As with most constitutional questions, their resolution 
reflects a judicial choice among competing arguments and value posi-
tions. On federal constitutional matters, the U.S. Supreme Court serves 
as the final arbiter of these contending views on constitutional principle. 
During the last three decades, the Court has issued a number of opinions 
in the field of property owners' rights generally thought to reinvigorate 
the "Takings" Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This enhanced sympathy 
for the landowner's perspective has been the result of the belief that, 
in earlier parts of the twentieth century, property rights had not been 
accorded the appropriate level of respect as had other personal liber-
ties.2 In a lengthening chain of decisions,3 the Court has attempted 
to give new meaning to the takings concept, trying to set forth a 
clearer idea of when government has gone, as Justice o'liver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. put it, "too far" and must pay compensation for its regu-
latory actions.4 
2. The application of low level due process scrutiny to local government land-use 
regulation led to the conclusion that most zoning classifications would be unassailable 
if they were imposed as part of a comprehensive zoning scheme. Heightened scrutiny 
in constitutional terms was only available for governmental classifications, which af-
fected fundamental liberties or imposed a suspect classification. Adverse economic 
impacts were to be sustained as just a cost of living in a civilized society under the 
average reciprocity of advantage theory. 
3. See San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 55 (1980); Williamson County Reg'! Planning 
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (I 985); First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comrn'n, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan v. City 
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
4. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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While the Supreme Court will set forth new constitutional interpre-
tations in occasional decisions, it is the task of the lower federal and 
state courts to refine and apply this doctrine in an ever-expanding num-
ber of cases. These courts actually give our Constitution its meaning 
through numerous specific applications. The Supreme Court might set 
the aspects of constitutional doctrine, the lower courts animate the doc-
trine in ways that have direct effects on society. This article will ex-
amine recent judicial interpretations testing the constitutionality of reg-
ulatory takings and development exactions. In particular, it will discuss 
current cases applying the Supreme Court's rulings in Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, and Dolan v. City 
of Tigard. 
II. Seeking Recourse in the Constitution to Stem 
Unreasonable Governmental Action: The Revival of 
Due Process Review 
The emergence of a more critical form of constitutional thought toward 
the public regulation of land and community development came at the 
end of a century which reinforced governmental power to act in the 
economy and in society. It has followed an increasingly visible and 
vocal sentiment that environmental regulation and land-use control has 
been unreasonable, unfair and even abusive to some landowners.5 
While the definition of "unreasonable" regulation can widely vary de-
pending upon one's point of view, recently litigated cases have high-
lighted examples of significant delay,6 unequal demands,? excessive and 
unfair exactions,8 and severe and adverse regulatory changes.9 How-
ever, it also may be possible that some property owners consider other 
governmental decisions and actions to be unreasonable or abusive when 
5. See e.g., Rodney L. Cobb, Land Use Law: Marred by Public Agency Abuse, 
LAND UsE L. & ZoNING DIG. 3 (Nov. 2000). Cobb identifies three broad contexts in 
which agency land-use abuses occur: (1) public agency's improper banishment of 
affordable housing and other land uses perceived to be undesirable, (2) conflicts over 
who will pay for the impacts of new development, and (3) severe regulations that do 
not allow development at all or only to a small degree. /d. at 4. These comments 
resonate because the author was then staff attorney for the American Planning Asso-
ciation and editor of the LAND USE LAW AND ZONING DIGEST. 
6. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) 
(5 year delay, 19 site plans, and density reduction from 1,000 to fewer than 200). 
7. Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)(village requirement of a 
33-foot easement dedication as a condition for municipal water supply hookup when 
it had required only a 15-foot easement from other landowners for a similar connection). 
8. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.825 (1987); Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
9. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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they represent genuine policy differences or changing views on matters 
affecting the community's development. 10 It is also conceivable that 
private landowners may act unreasonably by breaching commitments 
previously made to adhere to legitimate rules. 11 One of the most im-
portant challenges for establishing public policy and law in this field 
is in distinguishing between "unreasonable" and abusive government 
actions from actions that change previous policies and represent less 
financially lucrative outcomes. Separating the "unreasonable" and abu-
sive governmental actions from those that change previous policies and 
represent less financially lucrative outcomes is actually one of the most 
important challenges for establishing public policy and law in this field. 
With the image of governmental regulatory abuse prevalent in contem-
porary political discourse12 and occasionally even in Supreme Court 
opinions, 13 it is not surprising that property owner advocates press for 
adjustments in legal rules both to advance their clients' specific interests 
and to eliminate future episodes of unreasonable and abusive govern-
ment regulation. One current strategy is to advance an argument that a 
particularly unreasonable land-use decision violates the constitutional 
10. Is the down zoning to a lower density of a rural area of a county pursuant to the 
adoption of new anti-sprawl public policy in the county an example of governmental 
abuse or genuine policy difference. For instance, in Loudoun County, Virginia the 
Planning Commission proposed, as part of a slow-growth agenda, to revise the county's 
comprehensive plan to reduce the number of homes that could be built in the county 
over the next 20 years by 23,800. This move, amending the "theoretical build out 
analysis," was suggested in conjunction with a number of other environmental, trans-
portation and affordable housing policy initiatives. Even with this reduction, the com-
prehensive plan would still anticipate the housing stock to more than double to a total 
of 135,700 units within 20 years. See Michael Laris, Loudoun Blueprint Reins in 
Growth: 20-Year Plan Cuts Houses, Stresses Environment, WASH. PosT, May 2, 2001, 
at Bl. 
11. See Jerold S. Kayden, Using and Misusing Zoning Law to Design Cities: An 
Empirical Study of New York City's Privately Owned Public Spaces (Part 2), 53 LAND 
USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (Mar. 2001). 
12. Anti-government sentiment in the United States in the last 20 years has spawned 
the creation of political movements and voluntary organization whose principal aim is 
the reduction of governmental influence over the lives and affairs of individuals and 
firms. See Harvey M. Jacobs, The Anti-Environmental "Wise Use" Movement in Amer-
ica, 47 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. No. 3 (Feb. 1995). The spill-over effects of this 
sentiment transcend from one level of government to another-linking the federal gov-
ernment's actions in Waco, Texas. with planning and zoning decisions at the county 
level of government. 
13. Justice Scalia noted in the Nollan case that the Court regarded the Fifth Amend-
ment's Property Clause "to be more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with 
it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination." 483 U.S. 825,841 (1987). 
Justice Scalia was also heard at the oral argument in the Del Monte Dunes case char-
acterizing the landowner who had complied with nearly every planning department 
request and who had filed numerous revised development plans over a period of years 
as being "jerked around" by the local government. 
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precepts prohibiting the uncompensated "taking" of property embodied 
in the Fifth Amendment. 
Unfortunately, this recent process of doctrinal elaboration has re-
sulted in the blurring of two lines of constitutional thought about prop-
erty regulation: substantive due process and regulatory takings theory . 
. From the earliest twentieth century land-use cases, a substantive due 
process line of analysis was applied to determine whether a particular 
governmental regulation violated the due process values of excessive 
or irrational regulation. The well-known cases of Mugler v. Kansas, 14 
Welsh v. Swasey, 15 Reinman v. Little Rock, 16 and Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian17 represent early examples of this trend as does the landmark zon-
ing decision, Euclid v. Ambler Realty. 18 All of these early twentieth 
century U.S. Supreme Court decisions upheld local land-use regulations 
having substantial and severe implications on existing landowners 
while also serving important police power objectives. Following in the 
doctrinal line of Lochner v. New York, 19 this substantive due process 
approach had been used in a number of twentieth century cases testing 
the constitutionality of a wide range of government regulations of prop-
erty rights with extremely mixed results.20 In most cases, when a regu-
lation was correlated with the achievement of health, safety, or other 
traditional police power goals, it was sustained even during the period 
14. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Mugler involved state regulation of the alcoholic beverage 
business. The Supreme Court recognized under their police powers, state legislatures 
had broad authority to enact legislation to protect the public health, morals, and safety. 
However, the Court employed substantive due process review to evaluate the relation-
ship of a law to its stated purposes. This represented a departure from earlier practice 
of a large measure of judicial non-interference into state legislative judgments. While 
the Mugler court found such a relationship to exist in the state's interest in protecting 
its citizens from alcoholic beverages, it did set in motion a theme of constitutional 
review that would expose legislative judgments to close judicial scrutiny. See JOHN E. 
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 407-08 (6th ed. 2000). 
15. 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (upholding the constitutionality of Boston's height restric-
tions). 
16. 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (upholding the constitutionality of Little Rock's ordinance 
prohibiting livery stables from certain residential areas of the city). 
17. 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding Los Angeles ordinance banning existing brick 
manufacturing operations in emerging residential areas). 
18. Viii. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
19. 198 u.s. 49 (1905). 
20. Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding a Kansas statute prohibiting 
the manufacture of alcoholic beverages in the state); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 
(1917) (striking down racially based zoning); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393 (1922) (striking down the Pennsylvania Kohler Act preventing subsidence 
caused by coal mining); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (invali-
dating a zoning boundary line decision as arbitrary); Viii. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 
U.S. l (1974) (upholding zoning ordinance limiting the number of unrelated persons 
who could live together as a "family"); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 
(1977) (striking down zoning rule prohibiting habitation by nonsibling grandchildren). 
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of Lochner review. The key points to be derived from these Lochner 
era decisions were that (1) the framework of analysis was that of early 
twentieth century substantive due process and (2) the effect of a finding 
of an unconstitutional due process violation was the invalidation of the 
regulation, not a mandate to pay ')ust compensation."21 Substantive due 
process cases, fitting this traditional mold, have become less and less 
frequent due to a number of factors.22 Interestingly, modern Supreme 
Court cases have managed to interpret excessive or unreasonable land-
use regulation as a sub-category of Fifth Amendment takings law.23 
This transformation of substantive due process analysis has resulted in 
a confusing branch of the emerging regulatory takings doctrine--one 
with more questions than definitive answers. Understanding the modern 
origins of this development is worthy of attention. 
A. The Substantive Due Process Form of a 
Regulatory Taking 
Confusion over the U.S. Supreme Court's takings law may be attrib-
utable to a number of factors,24 not the least of which is the brief, eight-
page 1980 decision inAgins v. City ofTiburon.25 Arising at a time when 
the Supreme Court would begin to show greater sympathy for the plight 
of unfairly regulated landowners, the Agins case involved a five-acre 
parcel of undeveloped land in Tiburon, California, atop a ridge over-
looking San Francisco Bay. Although the owners had hoped to build 
21. In fact, even the landmark decision often identified as the ideological origin of 
the modern regulatory takings doctrine, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, could be 
viewed in the substantive due process tradition. See Robert Brauneis, The Foundation 
of Our Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's 
Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996). 
22. The reasons often given for the scarcity of substantive due process attacks on 
land-use control measures include: (1) the necessity in most courts of having an enti-
tlement or property interest to the land use approval, (2) the application of a relaxed 
standard of review, and (3) a general aversion of some courts to become embroiled in 
the review of municipal zoning ordinances. 
23. This transformation of substantive due process into a taking claim may reflect 
the judicial memory of the Lochner precedent and the resulting hesitation of federal 
courts to employ the substantive due process theory to strike down social and economic 
legislation. In fact, some federal circuits will not analyze a statute or ordinance under 
substantive process when a more specific constitutional provision such as the Fifth 
Amendment could apply. See e.g., Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 
1997). But see Tri-County Indus. Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 
1997), and Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992). Contrary 
to this position, it is equally conceivable that the Takings Clause could be but one 
subcategory of a due process violation. 
24. For a candid discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's less than harmonious reg-
ulatory takings precedent, see Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark not the Quark: Has 
the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory 
Takings Law, 30 URB. LAW. 307 (1998). 
25. 447 u.s. 255 (1980). 
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as many as twenty single-family homes on the land, the city adopted 
zoning which limited it to a total of one to five units. After the rezoning, 
the landowners filed an unsuccessful $2 million inverse condemnation 
claim against the city which was ultimately dismissed.26 Thereafter, 
they petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to challenge a decision by the 
California Supreme Court, which held that "inverse condemnation is 
an inappropriate and undesirable remedy in cases in which unconsti-
tutional regulation is alleged."27 In fact, this California opinion had 
focused on the question of appropriate remedy for "excessive regulation 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion .... "28 It concluded that judicial invalidation was the proper rem-
edy rather than a conversion of the police power regulation into an act 
of eminent domain. This it found to be consistent with "well established 
precedent."29 
Upon reaching the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Powell framed the 
Agins case as a question of whether the Tiburon zoning ordinance took 
Agins' property without paying just compensation. However, the land-
owners would not receive Supreme Court review of their taking claim 
since it was premature. Since the Agins plaintiffs had commenced lit-
igation without making an application for the use or improvement of 
their property nor seeking a definitive statement as to the number of 
dwelling units that would be permitted, Justice Powell found that there 
was no "concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific 
zoning provisions."30 It would seem that the dismissal of the Agins' "as 
applied" challenge on ripeness grounds would have ended things-but 
it did not. The Court's opinion then inexplicably announced the now-
familiar two-pronged takings test when it said, 
The application of a general zoning Jaw to particular property effects a taking if the 
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, see Nectow v. 
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 ... , or denies an owner economically viable use of 
his land, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n. 36 ... 
(1978).31 
Finally, Justice Powell then applied both prongs of this test to the 
facts before it and concluded that the Tiburon ordinance satisfied both 
elements. With this conclusion, the Court never even reached the cer-
26. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 28 (1979). 
27. 598 P.2d 25, 29 (1979). 
28. /d. at 28. In reaching this result, the California Supreme Court relied upon "a 
leading authority" in NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN. /d. 
29. /d. at 266, 598 P.2d at 29. 
30. 447 u.s. 255, 260 (1980). 
31. /d. at 260. 
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tified issue of defining the appropriate remedy for constitutional takings 
violation. 32 
A number of factors make the Agins Court's articulation of this two-
part takings test surprising, if not mystifying. First, the Court an-
nounced the takings test without being asked to do so by either party 
before it.33 Thus, Justice Powell's new takings law standard emanated 
from unexpressed ideas of the Court itself and not from arguments 
made by the litigants. The Court gave no hint why a substantive due 
process sounding claim should constitute a compensable Fifth Amend-
ment taking. Second, the Court in Agins stated this takings formulation 
within two years after the Court's important decision in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 34 The Penn Central case had 
set forth the relevant regulatory takings analysis, yet the Agins Court 
chose not to utilize the explicit factors laid out in it. The absence of a 
significant Penn Central decision is inexplicable. 
Third, Justice Powell introduced a novel "substantially advance le-
gitimate state interests" standard as a decisional principle for finding a 
Fifth Amendment taking of property without just compensation. The 
1928 case of Nectow v. City of Cambridge35 was cited as exclusively 
supporting precedent for this standard, but Nectow, like the contem-
poraneous Euclid v. Ambler Realty,36 is a substantive due process in-
validation decision-not a takings case. The Supreme Court in Nectow 
merely agreed with the decision made below that a growing district 
boundary was irrational and illogical. With the expansion in interest in 
landowner's rights, the Agins language has become a frequently cited 
32. Justice Powell noted that, 
The State Supreme Court determined that the appellants could not recover damages 
for inverse condemnation even if the zoning ordinances constituted a taking. The 
court stated that only mandamus and declaratory judgment are remedies available to 
such a landowner. Because no taking has occurred, we need not consider whether a 
State may limit the remedies available to a person whose land has been taken without 
just compensation. 
/d. at 263. In the end, the heart of the California Supreme Court's decision-and the 
part from which the Agins appealed-was not even considered by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Seven years later, the court would reach this issue and agree with the petitioners 
in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987). 
33. See Brief for Appellee, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138 
(1980)(No. 79-602); Brief for Appellant, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 
S. Ct. 2138 (1980)(No. 79-602). 
34. 438 u.s. 104 (1978). 
35. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). In the course of Justice Brennan's Penn Central survey 
of prior land-use regulation cases, there was mention of the Nectow decision. This 
review was merely descriptive and unrelated to the multi-factor balancing test that the 
Penn Central case has become known for. 
36. 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
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shorthand definition of a regulatory taking, one which focuses upon the 
legitimacy of the regulation rather than its economic impact. 
B. The Development of the Agins "Substantially 
Advance" Prong of Regulatory Takings 
In the years since the Supreme Court's 1980 decision inAgins, the two-
pronged takings test has been repeatedly cited by the Supreme Court 
and the lower federal court as part of its accepted regulatory takings 
jurisprudenceY The second prong, denial of economically viable use 
of land, later found amplification in 1992 in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council. However, the first prong, the "substantially advance" 
analysis-has not received sufficient explanation of its proper connec-
tion to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause rather than to the sub-
stantive due process principles from which it sprang. A review of recent 
case decisions reveals that the Agins "substantial relationship" takings 
test is being advanced by advocates for land development interests on 
a steady basis. This phenomena may have been encouraged by the 
Supreme Court's 1999 approval of the Ninth Circuit in City of Monterey 
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd, 38 which upheld a jury award of 
§ 1983 damages. In this case, the trial judge's jury instruction had been 
designed to frame the jury's decision in terms oftheAgins two-pronged 
takings test. 39 Del Monte Dunes, a development permit denial case, may 
prompt future federal litigation challenging adverse municipal land-use 
decisions. Such a trend in cases would ask judges and juries to interpret 
and apply the Agins test in numerous, concrete cases. If this trend were 
37. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 119 S. 
Ct. 1624, 1636 (1999); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 
(1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); 
and Nollan v. California Coastal Cornm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). 
38. 526 U.S. at 687,711, 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1999). 
39. Interestingly, the Supreme Court found no impropriety or inconsistency in the 
fact that the trial judge reserved the separate substantive due process claim for the court 
and ruled on that legal issue, while allowing the takings claim to proceed to the jury. 
/d. at 1637. This suggests that at least two separate characterizations of a permit denial 
claim are possible-takings and substantive due process-and that one can be reserved 
for a jury while the other may be properly reserved for judicial resolution. 
In Bamber v. U.S., 45 Fed. Cl. 162 (1999), a bank president, allegedly forced to 
resign from his position by federal savings and loan regulators, filed suit against the 
United States asserting a regulatory taking under the Agins test. The claims court dis-
missed this action ruling that the plaintiffs claims did not state a cause of action. The 
court reviewed the Agins "substantially advance" test and concluded that it "has not 
had a fruitful life," finding that "the only examples of which this court is aware, in 
which this approach has clearly been outcome determinative, have been the decisions 
in [Nollan] and [Dolan]. Neither decision helps plaintiff. .. . "/d. at 165. Limiting the 
doctrine to regulatory attempts to extort private real property interests, the court rejected 
the plaintiffs taking claim. 
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to continue, it would create a more activist role for the federal judiciary 
in policing state and local government land-use matters. This litigation 
actually would accomplish two separate things: (1) it would involve 
courts in a much closer analysis of the suggested rationales for gov-
ernmental action and (2) it would give them the power to invalidate 
and penalize those regulatory and other actions that could not be clearly 
and persuasively related to the achievement of legitimate government 
objectives. In this way, such a modem jurisprudential change would 
convert substantive due process review into a branch of the Takings 
Clause and by so doing, it would enforce due process values with Fifth 
Amendment financial sanctions. With this result, the "due process tak-
ing" recognized by the Agins precedent would actually go beyond the 
impact of judicial invalidation of decisions made during the Lochner 
era. 
C. The Recent Litigation Pattern 
The Del Monte Dunes decision might leave the impression that many 
cases are successfully challenging municipal land-use control activity. 
Generally, application of the Agins taking test has not resulted in many 
regulations being found to be unconstitutional takings. The argument 
has even been made unsuccessfully in unusual, nonland-use control 
settings.40 In fact, in some cases judges have been so hostile to multi-
faceted claims of unconstitutionality that they not only dismiss the ac-
tions but also grant attorney fees and litigation costs to the local gov-
ernment defending the action.41 Other courts have avoided a detailed 
consideration of the Agins "substantial relationship" test by basing a 
grant of summary judgment on the failure of the plaintiff to satisfy 
ripeness requirements imposed by the Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission decision 42 or by finding the absence of a prop-
erty interest in the plaintiff. It is clear that most federal courts consider 
the Agins "substantial relationship" theory to be an independent strand 
of regulatory takings doctrine under the Fifth Amendment, often stating 
that the Agins principle is "well-settled."43 However, there appears to 
40. Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 77 F. Supp. 2d 
699 (D. Md. 1999) (taking due process and equal protection attacks dismissed and 
$33,522 in attorney fees awarded to the county). 
41. 473 U.S. 172 (1985)(failure to seek a state compensation remedy prior to filing 
a federal lawsuit). 
42. American Federated Gen. Agency, Inc. v. City of Ridgeland, Mississippi, 72 F. 
Supp. 2d 695, 706 (S.D. Miss. 1999). The Supreme Court's decision in Keystone Bi-
tuminous Coal reinforced this view of the takings law by citing the Agins test and 
carefully examining the public purposes which lay behind the Pennsylvania law. 
43. In Del Monte Dunes, the trial court reserved for his own determination the 
separate question of whether the city's denial of developmental approval violated the 
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be some confusion on a number of issues including (1) the relationship 
between the two prongs of the Agins' takings test, are they cumulative 
or independent alternatives; (2) the relationship between traditional 
substantive due process analysis and the "substantial relationship" 
prong of the Agins' takings test"-4; (3) the degree of deference to be 
accorded to state and local government justifications for decision mak-
ing; and ( 4) the requisite "nexus" between the governmental regulation 
and legitimate state interests.45 Three recent state and federal court de-
cisions reflect this confusion and also the hesitation of many courts to 
use the Agins' test aggressively. 
In Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 46 the New 
York Court of Appeals considered a constitutional takings challenge to 
a 1994 municipal rezoning of a 150-acre, private golf course from resi-
dential to exclusively recreational use. At approximately the same time, 
the property owner had submitted a preliminary subdivision plan for 
the construction of seventy-one residential units for the golf course 
property. The rezoning to recreational use effectively prohibited the 
residential project. Through its legislative rezoning, the town had cho-
sen to reject the development proposal and to implement three, well-
documented local goals of (1) preserving open space, (2) providing 
recreational opportunities, and (3) mitigating flooding of both coastal 
and flood plain areas.47 
Following the rezoning, the plaintiffs initiated litigation attacking the 
local regulatory change as a taking, claiming that the rezoning was not 
sufficiently related to the three stated public purposes and that the zon-
ing changes deprived them of all economically viable uses of their 
land.48 Abandoning the economic deprivation argument, plaintiffs 
asked that the focus be on the "substantially advance" portion of the 
Agins test and invited the court of appeals to analyze the closeness of 
the causal nexus between the town's expressed objectives and there-
Due Process Clause. Although the jury found a violation of the Agins takings test, the 
trial court sustained the city against an attack on its decision based on the Due Process 
Clause. 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1637 (1999). 
44. Identifying the requisite test for evaluating the constitutionality of a regulatory 
action such as a permit denial is likely to be the crucial aspect of the new substantive 
due process taking theory. Advocates, including those in Del Monte Dunes, attempted 
to have courts adopt an enhanced or heightened "nexus" requirement between the 
regulation and the government's purpose as found in the Nollan and the Dolan cases. 
As Justice Kennedy observed in Del Monte Dunes, the Dolan rough proportionality 
test would be "inapposite to a case such as [Del Monte Dunes]." 119 S. Ct. at 1635. 
45. 94 N.Y.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1999). 
46. !d. at 104. 
47. !d. 
48. Id. 
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zoning decision.49 Viewing this as a request to impose a heightened 
standard of review found in the "essential nexus" standards derived 
from the Nollan and Dolan decisions, the court explicitly rejected the 
suggestion.50 Grounding its decision on the jury instruction approved 
in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, the New York court defined 
the "substantially advance" test as a determination of whether the reg-
ulatory action "bears a reasonable relationship to [the public] objec-
tive."51 Within the context of the Bonnie Briar case, the court of appeals 
found that the municipal rezoning action did bear the reasonable rela-
tionship to the enumerated public purposes and therefore satisfied the 
Agins' test. 52 This decision is significant in that ( 1) it rejected an intru-
sive form of judicial review of local government motivation in making 
a land-use change when there is a long documented study of the prob-
lems, (2) it accepted a careful and lengthy municipal process of study 
and documentation of the public interests at stake, and (3) it refused to 
strike down a policy response that "was more stringent than one might 
reasonably conclude was necessary to further public objectives."53 In 
retrospect, the New York Court of Appeals decision in Bonnie Briar 
retained the rhetoric of the Agins' takings test but infused it with a 
deferential substantive due process standard of review. The court sig-
naled that it would not use Agins as a means of reactivating a "height-
ened" form of review nor a shifting of the usual burden of proof to the 
regulator. It also was respectful of local government legislative re-
zoning processes, at least when they were based on thorough policy 
development. 
The Bonnie Briar case is not alone in taking this position. In Jim 
Sowell Construction Co. v. City of Coppell, Texas, 54 the district court 
ruled that a downzoning of a parcel of land previously zoned for multi-
family use did not constitute a taking of property under the Agins "sub-
stantially advance" takings test.55 This case presented a highly contro-
versial issue with the plaintiffs claiming that the city's rezoning was 
actually racially motivated and designed to exclude African-Americans 
and other minorities from the jurisdiction and that all of the city's other 
49. 94 N.Y.2d at 106. The court grounded its position on a reading of the Supreme 
Court's Del Monte Dunes case, which limited the more stringent nexus review to 
exaction situations only and not to general regulation of land-use matters. 
50. /d. at 108. 
51. /d. 
52. !d. 
53. 66 No. 3:96-CV-06-D, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9869, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 
2000). 
54. /d. 
55. !d. at *19. 
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justifications were contrived, pretextual, and "ex post facto."56 Impor-
tantly, the court assigned the burden of proving that the land-use de-
cision did not substantially advance legitimate state interests to the 
plaintiffs who were obligated to "designate specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial."57 The plaintiffs failed to carry this 
important burden with any evidence in the record58 and so they had 
also failed in demonstrating that the city's decisions were arbitrary or 
that they were taken for collateral purposes. 
Although addressing the issues presented in terms of the Agins for-
mulation, the court refused to require a heightened level of judicial 
scrutiny embodied in the Nollan "essential nexus" test or the Dolan 
"rough proportionality" test. These more rigorous tests of regulatory 
justification were reserved to cases imposing land-use exactions, in 
conformity with prior Fifth Circuit precedent.59 This appears to be a 
common position reinforced by Justice Kennedy's comments in the Del 
Monte Dunes case rejecting Dolan rough proportionality review in de-
nial of development cases. Furthermore, the court found that the city's 
evidence demonstrated that "its decisions in fact substantially advanced 
legitimate state interests."60 This evidence, derived from the testimony 
of the city's planning director and an expert witness, was considered 
adequate even though the court believed that the plaintiff had failed its 
burden. This case stands for the proposition that a plaintiff, arguing for 
a regulatory taking under the Agins rule, must present concrete evidence 
of municipal motivation that is not consistent with legitimate police 
power reasoning. No heightened scrutiny or careful analysis of munic-
ipal justification was applied in the Jim Sowell Construction Co. case 
and it appears that for this court, minimum rationality due process re-
view was sufficient.61 
There are some instances where the Agins "substantially advance" 
takings test is being applied in a more rigorous fashion. The case of 
Tandy Corporation v. City of Livonia62 is one such example. In Tandy, 
the owner of a 14-acre parcel purchased the land only after it was 
rezoned from professional office use to general commercial use.63 
56. /d. at *17. 
57. /d. at *22. 
58. Texas Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 
(5th Cir. 1996). 
59. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9869 at *22. 
60. For a similar view, see also Gosnell v. City of Troy, 59 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 
1995); Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal. 
4th 952, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93, 968 P.2d 993, 1001 (Cal. 1999). 
61. 81 F. Supp. 2d 800 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
62. /d. at 802. 
63. !d. 
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Tandy, the buyer, intended to construct an "Incredible Universe" com-
puter and retail electronics store on the site.64 For unrelated economic 
reasons, Tandy decided not to complete the Incredible Universe store 
and it entered into a sales agreement to sell the property, at a profit, 65 
to another developer who intended to develop the site as a commercial 
enterprise. Shortly after Tandy's agreement, the city council, "of its 
own initiative,"66 proposed that the Tandy property be rezoned back to 
the office use classification it had previously had. After consideration 
by the planning commission which resulted in a recommendation sup-
porting the rezoning and a public hearing held by the city council, the 
elected officials voted to restore the office use designation. A lawsuit 
was then filed by Tandy in spite of the fact that it had sold the property, 
in its rezoned condition, for a profit of roughly $300,000.67 
Tandy alleged that the city had committed separate constitutional 
violations based upon (1) substantive due process and (2) regulatory 
takings theory. In deciding the motion for summary judgment, the 
Tandy court merged the due process claim into the Agins regulatory 
takings "substantially advance" analysis. This analytical consolidation 
led the court to admit that it considered the required nexus between the 
regulatory action and the suggested legitimate state interest were 
"markedly" different for the two constitutional claims.68 For the sub-
stantive due process claim the plaintiff had a heavy burden of proving 
that there was "no rational relationship" between regulatory means and 
proper governmental ends. On the other hand, for the regulatory takings 
claim, the plaintiff's burden was "somewhat lessened" in that the plain-
tiff need show that the zoning change does not "substantially advance" 
the proffered state interest. 
Following an extensive examination of the city's multiple justifica-
tions for the rezoning, the court concluded that as a matter of law the 
city had failed both standards.69 This conclusion was the result of the 
64. Tandy had paid $6.1 million for the commercially zoned parcel and it later 
signed a purchase agreement to sell the property for $7.25 million. The agreement 
contemplated that the land would be developed as commercial property. !d. at 804. 
65. /d. 
66. /d. at 806. 
67. !d. at 811, note 6. 
68. !d. at 814. 
69. The court rejected the three reasons given by the Livonia Planning Commission 
and one reason offered by a city council member during deliberations on the rezoning 
ordinance. A fifth rationale suggested by another city council member, whether there 
had been an improvement in the professional office market in Livonia justifying the 
zoning change to permit only office use, was left for trial since a factual dispute re-
mained on the issue. This searching and critical inquiry into some arguably plausible 
reasons for the city's rezoning decision shows a court in full second-guessing mode of 
the Livonia's choices. For instance, the city stated one reason for the office use des-
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court's searching and critical exploration into the proffered explana-
tions given by the city. The level of critique was deep and skeptical of 
most of the justifications for the rezoning back to professional office 
use.70 This level of judicial intervention appears to be a tremendous 
departure from the extremely deferential substantive due process re-
view of land-use decision making in past years. Furthermore, under the 
guise of undertaking regulatory takings review, the district court tested 
the city council's legislative revision with a critical analysis worthy of 
administrative law's substantial evidence test applied to certain agency 
decisions. The Tandy case stands in stark contrast to the contempora-
neous Bonnie Briar and Jim Sowell Construction Company cases de-
cided by other courts. The contrast reveals that while many courts have 
not used the Agins "substantially advance" test as a means of closely 
policing municipal land-use practices, others will employ this consti-
tutional doctrine as authorization for highly intrusive review. 
III. Limits on the Power of Government to Require 
Land Exactions from Developers 
The Supreme Court has shown special interest in the area of develop-
ment exactions as a form of conditional land-use regulation. The Court, 
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, established the rule for 
determining the constitutionality of such exactions as requiring an es-
sential nexus between the nature of the condition and some public need 
generated by the development proposal. The later case of Dolan v. City 
of Tigard extended this nexus measure to determine whether there is a 
"rough proportionality" between the quantum of the exaction and the 
harms caused by the regulated activity. Both of these cases represented 
instances where the state or local government was exercising its regu-
latory authority to force a landowner to contribute a land interest or 
easement to the public as a condition of approval. While there has been 
a long tradition of imposing these regulatory conditions as part of 
subdivision regulation, the expanded use of exactions, broadly defined, 
ignation was that it wished to promote a use of the Tandy tract that was "compatible 
and harmonious" with surrounding land. While agreeing with this characterization, the 
court rejected the city's explanation by concluding that commercial development was 
also compatible with the existing uses. Similarly, the court rejected the city's reason 
that it wished to continue the development of the Victor office park for professional 
offices rather than commercial uses. /d. at 812. 
70. See e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (varied impact 
fees); Strom v. City of Oakland, 583 N.W.2d 311 (1998) (soil erosion site manage-
ment); Burton v. Clark County, 958 P.2d 343 (1998) (road improvements); and Curtis 
v. Town of South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657 (Me. 1998) (pond for fire protection). 
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has given rise to litigation challenging their imposition and demanding 
a higher level of judicial scrutiny following the Nollan and Dolan 
precedents.71 
Recent cases reviewing land dedication requirements under the Nol-
lan/Dolan tests show that the courts have not yet settled on a consistent 
jurisprudence for the application of the rough proportionality test, and 
there continues to be a variety of results in its application. For example, 
the Washington appellate courts have used Dolan to invalidate not only 
monetary payments, but also a city ordinance requiring a 30 percent 
set-aside requirement for open space land. On the other hand, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals refused to apply Dolan's rough proportionality 
test to a required set-aside of recreational land for the use of subdivision 
residents in a strong opinion upholding subdivision controls by local 
government. Where applied in a Michigan appellate opinion to require-
ments for improving private roadway access, the court found that the 
rough proportionality test had been satisfied. In a Sixth Circuit opinion, 
a plaintiff who alleged suspect motives in a requirement for land con-
veyance to a neighbor was prevented by ripeness considerations to first 
go to state court on its takings claim, while being allowed to proceed 
on an equal protection claim. In Oregon, a local ordinance mandating 
that the applicant prepare a Dolan analysis was upheld. Finally, a fed-
eral district court refused to apply Dolan to New York City's watershed 
protection program, which limits development in the city's watershed. 
All in all, this review of recent cases reveals that exaction challenges 
are being litigated by landowners, but the results are mixed at best. The 
following discussion provides more detail on each of these decisions. 
In City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 72 the Watermans developed a 
3-acre, three-phased subdivision beginning in the late 1970s. When 
obtaining subdivision approval of the first phase, they agreed to provide 
recreational space for residents in the first phase, in the amount of 2,375 
square feet "in an appropriate location," when developing the later 
phases. When the third phase was submitted for subdivision approval, 
the city planning and zoning commission decided that a recreational 
easement containing 5,598 square feet and running across the rear of 
the eight units in that phase did not meet the recreational area require-
ment. The Watermans successfully challenged that denial in the circuit 
court, and afterward, based on newly enacted site planning require-
ments, the city council approved the subdivision with a limitation that 
71. 745 A.2d 1000 (Md. 2000). 
72. 112 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D. N.Y. 2000). 
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the required recreation area be located on a proposed single-family lot. 
Again, the Watennans brought the city to circuit court, which found 
that the conditions created an unconstitutional taking. 
On appeal, in a strongly worded and comprehensive discussion of 
subdivision control, Maryland's highest court reversed the lower state 
courts, finding that the recreational space requirement as a condition to 
subdivision approval was not a regulatory taking. The court distin-
guished between required dedications of land in which the land is made 
open to the public generally, and the instant condition, which could be 
construed to require only that the residents of the subdivision would 
have the right to use the area. The court found that the Dolan rough 
proportionality test was applicable to the first, but not the second kind 
of exaction. The court then analyzed whether the condition created a 
loss of all viable economic use of the subdivision taken as a whole and 
found the condition to not be a taking. 
In Kittay v. Givliani, 73 the bankruptcy trustee for a real estate devel-
opment corporation brought a takings claim and other federal consti-
tutional claims against New York City. The trustee claimed that the 
city's program to protect its watershed area, located upstream within 
more than eighty municipalities, created a taking of the bankrupt cor-
poration's property. By Memorandum of Agreement with the munici-
palities and the state, and state regulation, the city prohibited activities 
that could cause degradation of the watershed. The regulations included 
permit variance procedures. On the city's motion to dismiss, the district 
court held that the plaintiff's as-applied claims were not ripe for ad-
judication because Kittay had not attempted to obtain a variance or 
other approvals. On the facial challenge, the court found that because 
the regulations by their very language provide for permit and variance 
procedures, Kittay could not argue that it has suffered a deprivation of 
the economic use of its property. The court refused to apply the Nol-
lan/Dolan "rough proportionality" test, because the case did not involve 
a mandated dedication of property or physical taking. 
Forseth v. Village of Sussex14 represents another federal court chal-
lenge. In it, the Forseths attempted to develop 30 acres of land as a 
residential subdivision, obtaining preliminary plat approval from the 
Village of Sussex in 1993. Before they obtained approval of the final 
plat, a neighbor to the proposed subdivision, Mr. Tews, was elected 
73. 199 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2000). 
74. Williams County Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
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president of the village board. The Forseths alleged that president Tews 
persuaded the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to perform a wetland sur-
vey on their property, resulting in the discovery of more wetlands. They 
also allege that the village council required that the Forseths, as a con-
dition of final plat approval, convey a portion of their property to Mr. 
Tews as a buffer strip, at a severely reduced price. All of these claims 
represented allegations of truly unreasonable municipal conduct. 
After obtaining final plat approval, the Forseths filed suit in federal 
court asserting substantive due process, equal protection, and takings 
violations, as well as various state law claims. The takings claim argued 
that the conveyance to Mr. Tews represented an unconstitutional con-
dition, and that the village's design and construction of its current drain-
age system failed to adequately control the flow of strong water runoff 
from adjacent subdivisions and thus increased the areas of wetlands 
within the development. The district court, apparently unwilling to be-
come embroiled in this dispute, dismissed the federal claims as not ripe 
and refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 
claims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the tak-
ings and substantive due process claims, finding them not ripe because 
the Forseths had failed to utilize their state law remedies as required 
by the Williamson County case. 75 On the equal protection claim, the 
court held that the allegations of malicious conduct of a governmental 
agent are independent from the takings claim and not subject to the 
Williamson ripeness requirement. Echoing the similar claims of outra-
geous municipal conduct made in 0/ech v. Village of Willowbrook, the 
court remanded this issue. 
Some courts actually do apply the Nollan/Dolan tests to municipal 
practices. In Dowerk v. Charter Township of O:iford, 76 the Dowerk's 
owned a 10-acre parcel of land zoned for single-family residences, 
which was accessible only by an existing, unimproved private roadway. 
They sought building permits to construct homes and a variance to the 
requirement that existing private roads be brought up to current public 
standards. The landowner petitioned for the creation of a special as-
sessment district to pay for the road costs, but upon objection by af-
fected landowners, the township declined to create the district. Dowerk 
then brought suit claiming that the roadway improvement requirements 
were an unconstitutional taking. The Michigan court applied the Nol-
lan/Dolan tests and found that the road requirements substantially fur-
75. 592 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. App. 1998). 
76. /d. at 731. 
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thered a legitimate government interest in ensuring access to residential 
property by emergency vehicles. Although noting that the township 
does not require a dedication of land to public use, but only the up-
grading of the private access road, the court applied Dolan to find that 
the roadway conditions impose a burden that is in at least rough pro-
portion to the increased traffic and public safety concerns that would 
follow from the proposed development. Finally, the court pointed out 
that the plaintiff could still develop or sell the property as a single parcel 
without having to upgrade the road, and thus they failed to show the 
loss of all economic viability. 
The court found no procedural due process violation in the town-
ship's refusal to create the special assessment district or to provide 
alternative avenues for complying with the roadway conditions. The 
township's decisions against the plaintiff were informed by input from 
both experts and interested parties and within its discretion accorded 
under state law. Ultimately, the court characterized the case as having 
to do "with allocating the costs of development. Although constitu-
tional principles forbid forcing one person to absorb the costs of a 
public benefit, neither do they require forcing others to shoulder the 
burdens of one person's aspirations to develop real property. "77 
A recent decision focused on the procedural aspects of implementing 
the Dolan decision. In Lincoln City Chamber of Commerce v. City of 
Lincoln City, 78 the chamber of commerce and the Legal Advocacy 
Group challenged city ordinances that required a report from any ap-
plicant asserting that it could not legally be required to provide road, 
drainage, and sidewalk easements for land improvements. This report 
had to be prepared by a qualified civil or traffic engineer and had to 
provide evidence as to whether the site plan, building permit, and use 
permits, required improvements that are not roughly proportional to the 
estimated impact of the development. The plaintiffs asserted that Dolan 
places the burden of proof on governmental bodies to demonstrate 
rough proportionality, and thus the ordinance requirement unconstitu-
tionally shifted that burden to the applicants instead of the govern-
mental bodies. 
The court agreed with the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals anal-
ysis of this case that Dolan was not concerned with "the burden of 
proof' in the conventional, evidentiary, and adversarial sense. Instead, 
the local government's task was to articulate and substantiate the req-
77. 991 P.2d 1080 (Or. App. 1999), rev. denied, 6 P.3d 1101 (Or. 2000). 
78. 990 P.2d 429 (Wash. App. 1999), rev. granted, 10 P.3d 1071 (Wash. 2000). 
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uisite facts and legal conclusions for its decision. The report require-
ment was simply an application requirement and did not eliminate or 
diminish the ultimate city responsibility to demonstrate findings that its 
conditions have roughly proportional to the impact of the improved 
developments. The ordinance requirements were found to not be fa-
cially unconstitutional, but the court left open the possibility that it 
could be found unconstitutional as applied in particular cases. 
Isla Verde International Holding, Inc. v. City ofCamas79 was another 
challenge to subdivision open space and road access requirements be-
fore the Washington appellate court. Isla Verde had proposed a resi-
dential subdivision of fifty-one lots, which was approved subject to 
conditions that it set aside 30 percent (4 acres) of the subdivision as 
open space and that it provide a secondary access road for emergency 
purposes. The company challenged the subdivision conditions, and the 
trial court found that the road requirement violated due process and 
state statutes and that the open space set-aside requirement was an 
unconstitutional taking. Reversing the trial court invalidation of the 
road requirement, the court of appeals found that the requirement 
achieved a legitimate public purpose, which was reliable access for 
emergency vehicles, and that the secondary access road was reasonably 
necessary to achieve that access. It also found that the road condition 
was not unduly oppressive considering the nature of the harm to be 
avoided, the ineffectiveness of less drastic measures, and the lack of 
evidence regarding any extraordinary costs to the property owner. 
The Washington court held that the dedication requirement was sub-
ject to a Dolan analysis, even though the property owner association, 
and not the local government, would retain ownership of the land set 
aside. Under Dolan's first prong, the court found an essential nexus 
between the public need to preserve open space for wildlife and rec-
reation and the project's destruction of approximately 13 acres of open 
space. However, the condition failed the second prong of Dolan be-
cause there was insufficient evidence that the 30 percent set-aside was 
roughly proportional to the subdivision's impact. The appellate court 
upheld the trial court's refusal to allow the city to submit additional 
evidence on that issue, because it was not available at the city council 
proceeding. 
Finally, in Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 80 the city 
79. 972 P.2d 944 (Wash. App. 1999), rev. granted, cause remanded by 989 P.2d 
1140 (Wash. 1999), on remand, 14 P.3d 172 (Wash. App. 2000). 
80. 14 P.3d at 174. 
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had conditioned plat approval for a 20-acre subdivision on payments 
for the provision of half-street improvements to a street adjoining the 
subdivision, although the street did not directly access the subdivision. 
On remand from the initial trial court decision, both the city and the 
landowner had performed traffic studies to consider the traffic impacts 
related to half-street improvements. Neither study concluded that the 
development would cause the street traffic to increase or the street to 
become more unsafe, although the city's study noted that the street did 
not meet current standards for width and lane configuration. The Wash-
ington appellate court in 1999 found that the condition was an uncon-
stitutional taking under Dolan, specifically rejecting an argument that 
there is a constitutional distinction between the dedication of land and 
the payment of a fee. The Washington Supreme Court granted review 
and remanded the case to the court of appeals in light of City of Mon-
terey v. Del Monte Dunes. 
On remand, the appellate court affirmed its initial decision. The court 
rejected the city's argument that Del Monte Dunes clarified that only 
dedication of land as a condition to approval was subject to the Dolan 
test. While conceding that Nollan and Dolan "were unique in requiring 
dedications of real property," the court explained that in each case the 
government "required the developer to make an affirmative contribu-
tion to solve a public problem that existed, at least in part, outside the 
developed property."81 The court emphasized the similarity of exacting 
land and money and noted that the facts in Del Monte Dunes are dis-
tinguishable because the government there did not exact land or money. 
It explained that the attempted transfer of a public burden to some 
people alone, where the burdens should be borne by the public as a 
whole, requires the application of the Dolan "rough proportionality" 
test. 82 
IV. Conclusion 
The interests of individuals and those of the community frequently 
seem to be in tension. The individual landowner conceives of property 
rights as an aspect of his or her personal freedom and then considers 
the restrictions or prohibitions of regulation to be unreasonable or un-
lawful. Often, the needs of the community are perceived to be in op-
position to the self-interest of the individual-caused by expanding 
regulatory aims and the financial pressures imposed upon local gov-
81. !d. at 175. 
82. 
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ernment by rapid growth. The norms of local land-use regulation de-
velop within a community influenced over time by state enabling au-
thority changes and by local practices and traditions. Generally, these 
social demands are accepted by landowners as long as their develop-
ment objectives can be accomplished. When local government acts in 
a way which blocks or frustrates these desires, the landowners may 
consider the land-use regulation to be unfair or unreasonable and they 
may challenge the legitimacy of the process or the restrictions. Such a 
challenge could take many forms: undertaking a publicity campaign to 
influence public opinion in support of the project, lobbying planning 
staff, local attorneys, and elected officials for a more favorable project 
treatment, having a more receptive law or policy formally adopted by 
the local government, seeking a legislative change in the state's en-
abling authority, and receiving assistance through judicial review. Each 
method has its costs and benefits. 
The litigation method with a constitutional basis has a different na-
ture. Such a method asks for court action based upon the interpretation 
and application of general constitutional principles to specific cases and 
it seeks to limit governmental action even when it is authorized and 
when it has been tacitly accepted in the past by those subject to control. 
Constitutional review asks judges to exercise principled power to in-
validate actions taken by democratically elected officials and by their 
employees. With this monopoly on the authority of defining constitu-
tional meaning, the courts must carefully decide when to intervene and 
what the relevant principle means. This article has described and ana-
lyzed emerging trends in the application of the Supreme Court's more 
recent due process and takings doctrine as it has been interpreted by 
the lower federal and the state courts. From this review it appears that 
landowner litigants have been encouraged by the Supreme Court's re-
cent decisions and rhetoric, which have carried a more sympathetic tone 
to their views, and they have attempted to involve the lower federal 
and state courts in a more intensive policing of municipal land-use 
decision making. In analyzing this assortment of case decisions, it can 
hardly be said that these tribunals have applied the generally more 
landowner-oriented takings jurisprudence in an expansive and more 
aggressive fashion. Although invited to by plaintiffs, the courts have 
been reluctant to exercise the constitutional power by determining due 
process and takings violations; rather, choosing to reverse only the most 
egregiously unfair conduct while reinforcing most reasonable and de-
fensible land-use control efforts. Increasingly, the message to state and 
local governments has been a supportive one yet one that requires a 
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clearer justification of public regulation to the legitimate purposes of 
government. By taking this approach, the courts have declined to be 
assertive in exercising their constitutional interpretive power in decid-
ing the norms of regulatory behavior yet demanding greater discipline 
in the exercise of land-use control powers. 
